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Abstract
Background: The first outbreak of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infection in horses in Sweden
occurred in 2008 at the University Animal Hospital and highlighted the need for improved infection prevention
and control. The present study describes interventions and infection prevention control in an equine hospital
setting July 2008 - April 2010.
Method: This descriptive study of interventions is based on examination of policy documents, medical records,
notes from meetings and cost estimates. MRSA cases were identified through clinical sampling and telephone
enquiries about horses post-surgery. Prospective sampling in the hospital environment with culture for MRSA and
genotyping of isolates by spa-typing and pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) were performed.
Results: Interventions focused on interruption of indirect contact spread of MRSA between horses via staff and
equipment and included: Temporary suspension of elective surgery; and identification and isolation of MRSA-
infected horses; collaboration was initiated between authorities in animal and human public health, human
medicine infection control and the veterinary hospital; extensive cleaning and disinfection was performed; basic
hygiene and cleaning policies, staff training, equipment modification and interior renovation were implemented
over seven months.
Ten (11%) of 92 surfaces sampled between July 2008 and April 2010 tested positive for MRSA spa-type 011, seven
of which were from the first of nine sampling occasions. PFGE typing showed the isolates to be the outbreak
strain (9 of 10) or a closely related strain. Two new cases of MRSA infection occurred 14 and 19 months later, but
had no proven connections to the outbreak cases.
Conclusions: Collaboration between relevant authorities and the veterinary hospital and formation of an infection
control committee with an executive working group were required to move the intervention process forward.
Support from hospital management and the dedication of staff were essential for the development and
implementation of new, improved routines. Demonstration of the outbreak strain in the environment was useful
for interventions such as improvement of cleaning routines and interior design, and increased compliance with
basic hygienic precautions. The interventions led to a reduction in MRSA-positive samples and the outbreak was
considered curbed as no new cases occurred for over a year.
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A worldwide, steady increase in nosocomial and commu-
nity-acquired infections due to methicillin-resistant Sta-
phylococcus aureus (MRSA) is apparent in humans.
Carriage and infections in animals are also reported by
many authors [1-7]. The first reported findings of MRSA
in equines were in broodmares with endometritis [8,9],
but surgical site and traumatic wound infections have
been most frequently described [4,10-12]. A special
sequence type (ST), 398, has emerged in livestock and
horses in European countries [5,7,12-16]. ST398 has also
become relatively frequent among MRSA isolates in the
human community in some European countries [15-17].
The frequency of MRSA in animals in Sweden is still
considered low. MRSA was first detected in Sweden in
dogs in 2006 [18] and the first positive horse in Sweden
was one nasal carrier found in a MRSA screening study
of 300 healthy horses in 2007 [18]. In a recent (2010-
2011) screening study of 284 horses, none tested positive
for MRSA [19].
In animal hospitals, MRSA is a hazard also for the staff.
Colonisation of veterinarians, technicians, students and
other people in contact with infected or colonised animals
has been reported [20-22]. MRSA is notifiable and subject
to mandatory tracing in man, and notifiable in animals in
Sweden according to the legislation SJVFS 2007:90.
Human and veterinary health authorities collaborate in
epidemiological matters. Furthermore, the Swedish Work
Environment Authority (SWEA) makes assessments of
microbiological hazards by inspections at workplaces and
requires any risks to staff to be dealt with [23].
Many outbreaks of MRSA in humans, with their causes,
interventions and consequences, have been investigated
[1,3,24-29]. The epidemiology of MRSA in equine hospi-
tals has been studied in countries with higher MRSA fig-
ures than Sweden [11,12,30]. For the detection of MRSA
in the human or animal hospital environment, different
sampling and culture methods have been used and evalu-
ated [12,31,32]. Despite this, to the best of our knowledge
no standard or recommended method for the environ-
mental screening of MRSA is available. Harmonisation of
environmental sampling and culture was attempted in a
European Union study of MRSA in dust in pig settings.
All participating countries used the same swab technique,
culture and typing methods, which were validated [33].
The first outbreak of MRSA in a Swedish equine hospi-
tal acted as the trigger to initiate infection prevention
and control interventions. Two major interventions have
been recommended for the prevention of spread of anti-
microbial resistant bacteria in human healthcare, namely
infection prevention and control by improved cleaning,
better hand hygiene and clothing routines, and restriction
of antimicrobial use [34-36]. In Sweden, discussions and
awareness on restricting the use of antibiotics in animals
were fairly well established before the referred outbreak
[18,19], while basic hygiene in equine settings has been
less thoroughly discussed. In this study we therefore
focused on infection prevention and control.
The aim of the present study was to describe and dis-
cuss infection prevention and control measures underta-
ken to curb an outbreak of nosocomial MRSA infection
and achieve long-term improvement of infection preven-
tion and control in a Swedish equine hospital.
Methods
Study design
This was a descriptive study of interventions based on
retrospective examination of policy documents, medical
records, notes from meetings and cost estimates gener-
ated by the first MRSA infections in horses in Sweden.
Prospective environmental sampling for MRSA with
genotyping of isolates by spa-typing and pulsed-field gel
electrophoresis (PFGE) was performed from July 2008 to
April 2010 to investigate potential spread of an outbreak
strain within the hospital.
The study has approval, C 120/7, by the Ethical Com-
mittee on Animal Experiments, Uppsala, Sweden. The
study met the existing Swedish laws and legislations;
MRSA is notifiable in animals according to SJVFS
2007:90 and in humans notifiable and subjected to man-
datory tracing according to the law SFS 2004:168 and
regulation 2004:255.
The outbreak
The outbreak is described in detail by Bergstrom et al. [37]
and is only briefly summarised below. Six horses suffered
from surgical site infections (SSI) due to MRSA ST398
spa-type t011 during a two-month period from the end of
May to July 2008 in an equine hospital in Sweden. Geno-
typing by PFGE confirmed the outbreak by showing that
all isolates were of the same origin. Case 1 underwent sur-
gery on 22 May (Table 1) and Cases 2 and 3 were operated
within the following 10 days to early June. Cases 1-3 had
indirect contact through operating theatres or surgical
equipment [37]. Cases 4, 5 and 6 underwent surgery
within a six-day period in the first week of July. Case 6
was an emergency and the only horse that underwent sur-
gery after the second case was detected and an outbreak
was suspected. Post-operative horses, except Case 6, were
housed in Stable A after surgery (Figure 1). Case 1 was
euthanized in the hospital on June 2 and Cases 2, 3, 4 and
5w e r ed i s c h a r g e d .C a s e6r e m ained in the isolation unit
until mid-December. Case finding through tracing of
asymptomatic contacts with nasal screening in the home
stables of Cases 1, 2 and 3 was decided upon by the Swed-
ish Board of Agriculture (SJV) in July.
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Time Course and Intervention
2008
Jan Jan 1, Methicilin-resistant coagulase-positive staphylococci notifiable in animals in Sweden.
June 12 June, MRSA Case 1 diagnosed. Surgery on May 22.
July, main outbreak
month
4 July, Case 2 diagnosed (surgery on 2 Jun). Outbreak suspected. Five of six horses infected had undergone
surgery at this time. Elective surgery suspended and Stable A closed. First telephone meeting with human and
veterinary authorities.
16 July, Meeting 1 - at the UDS with community vet, public health nurse + SVA.
Tracing - 45 horses had surgery during outbreak, 37 answers, four suspects, one MRSA-positive.
18-30 July, Case 3, 4 and 5 diagnosed, sampled at home as clinical infection. Case 5 traced by phone.
22 July, first environmental sampling, 7 of 18 positive (7/18) (Table 2). Door knobs disinfected.
Consultation visit, human infection control (IC). IC committee + executive working group formed.
Disinfectant dispensers installed at all sinks and doors.
Replacement of water feeders with buckets started.
Aug 16 Aug, Case 6 diagnosed, emergency surgery on 7 July, stayed isolated in UDS until mid-Dec.
Meeting 2 - IC consultation, county vet, heads of UDS, further discussions + planning.
Meeting 3 - with staff concerning sampling of personnel and education of basic hygiene.
Cleaning of surgery unit - theatres cleaned by professional hospital cleaners.
Cleaning routines - critical points tenside + isopropylalcohol disinfection, cleaning detergent only.
Implementation - e.g. surgery routine, no brush of skin, soap + alcohol-based hand disinfect.
Equipment test - endoscope (culture working canal), arthroscope, disinfector, autoclave.
Elective surgery restarted.
Sep - Nov Basic hygiene policy + personal appearance, for staff to read and sign.
Lecture - to staff about MRSA, hygiene, infection control and the implementation process.
Voluntary MRSA sampling of staff, 12/30 sampled, all neg.
Cleaning - elimination of loose equipment and cleaning of stables.
Replacing - most water feeders + cribs replaced by buckets. Salt stones + holders abolished.
Second environmental sampling - 1/14, on pooled sample from 21 door knobs pos (Table 2).
Dec Third environmental sampling - retest of door knobs divided into seven samples, 0/7 (Table 2).
Written routines - surgery unit including hygiene, cleaning, instrument washing + disinfection and preparing
horses for surgery.
Written report from IC consultant, what had been achieved and what remained to be done.
2009
Jan - Feb Renovation - recovery rooms new floor/walls, flusher disinfector installed.
Written routines for cleaning and disinfection of stables, day patient area + ISO.
Written routines disinfection of flexible endoscopes.
Mar - July Meetings - staff, lectures as in Sept 2008 + implementation.
Fourth environmental sampling - 1/17, hand touch surface surgery unit pos (Table 2).
Written routines for ISO area revised.
Sep MRSA case - pressure sore, foal kept in ISO.
Fifth environmental sampling - 0/11 (Table 2).
Oct Feedback - staff lecture, discussion hygiene policy.
Sixth environmental sampling - 0/5 (Table 2).
2010
Jan Feedback - staff, feedback on pilot study and infection control/basic hygiene discussions
Mar MRSA case - SSI, horse kept in ISO.
Seventh and eighth environmental sampling - 0/15 and 0/3 respectively (Table 2).
Apr Ninth environmental sampling - ISO, 1/3, stall pos (Table 2).
Continuing work; Revaluation, revision of routines, education, implementation etc.
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horses were detected in the hospital during the study
period (Table 1). A foal admitted to the hospital for
neonatal care in the last week of June 2009 revisited in
August for minor surgery without complications, but on
a third visit in September 2009 MRSA was detected in a
pressure wound caused by bandages. In February 2010 a
horse underwent surgery and was readmitted with an
MRSA infection.
Setting at the time of the outbreak
The outbreak occurred in the Equine Clinics (UDS) at
the University Animal Hospital, Swedish University of
Agricultural Sciences. A large animal ambulatory service
and small animal clinics were housed in the same build-
ing complex as the UDS. The section for diagnostic
imaging, which served all clinics, was adjacent to the
UDS. The UDS offered advanced medical, surgical,
orthopaedic and intensive care and specialist clinics. A
Figure 1 Surfaces testing positive for MRSA in ward A of the equine hospital. Samples from July 2008. Dots denote positive environmental
samples: Yellow - door knobs, Blue - ISO, Turquoise - cribs and salt stones, Brownish-red - sling/traverse (see also Table 2). Some dots represent
pooled samples e.g. in the lameness run-up, one cloth was used in 21 door knobs making one pooled sample and in Stall A several salt stones
+ cribs were sampled with one cloth. Green area is the surgery unit. The smaller green area is ‘room 3’ for standing surgery procedures. The
pinkish-brown squares are stalls housing MRSA-positive horses during the outbreak. 1 - Stable A, 2 - arrow towards ward B, 3 - stable yard, 4 -
isolation unit in ward A, 5 - front desk, 6 - main entrance, 7 - lameness run-up corridor.
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hospital at one time.
Regular opening hours were 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. The emer-
gency unit accepted calls until 12 p.m. and 24-h critical
patient care was provided. Five to six veterinarians and
12 to 15 technicians worked in the hospital during the
regular opening hours. One or two veterinarians and
technicians worked the evening shift. Up to eight veterin-
ary students at a time and teachers were involved in clini-
cal work during teaching periods, approximately from
mid-August to mid-December and mid-January to mid-
June. Most of the staff had long working experience but
less formal training in infection control.
The building that houses the UDS was built in the mid-
1970s and divided into two wings, here called Wards A
(Figure 1) and B. The wards had a similar design; a central
corridor with stables, examination/treatment, cleaning and
storage rooms, staff and students facilities etc. on either
side. The stables contain one to eight stalls with an
entrance from a yard shared between Ward A and B and
one from the central corridor. Floors and main walls were
made of rough concrete, while intersecting walls between
stalls were made of rough wood in Ward A and polyethy-
lene in Ward B.
Ward A housed the main activities, with the main
entrance, front desk, day patients and surgery unit. The
central corridor served as a communication and lameness
run-up area, where day patients and hospitalised horses
could meet (Figure 1). Stable A was the main stable for
surgical aftercare (Figure 1). The stables near the main
entrance housed the day patients. Isolation units (ISO)
were available in both wards: in Ward A as one unit with
four separate stalls, an adjoining ante-room to each stall
and a common treatment area (Figure 1), in Ward B as
four separate stables with one stall and ante-room in
each stable. The intensive care unit (ICU) was a stable
with three stalls in Ward B and, if needed, the ISO in
Ward B was also used as an ICU. Ward B also housed
some specialist clinics.
Sinks, liquid soap, hand disinfectant dispensers and
paper towels were available in all stables, examination/
treatment rooms and the ante-room to the surgery thea-
tres. Hand disinfectant dispensers were also available at
the bandage and medication cart. Equipment such as hal-
ters, halter-chain, muzzles, twitches and mucking-out
items such as pitch forks, shovels, etc. were kept in the
stables.
Infection prevention and control at the beginning of the
outbreak
Work to extend and improve infection prevention and
control in the clinic had started about a year before the
outbreak, but no written routines had yet been established.
Informal routines were practised at the time of the out-
break, as briefly described below.
Working clothes were provided by the hospital, and
changed when needed, i.e. when dirty or daily. Clothing
routines in the surgical unit were: change from work
clothes to scrub suits and designated footwear and, during
procedures, disposable gowns, hats, gloves and masks.
The hair around the surgical site of the horses was
removed with a disinfected close-cutting shears and the
skin was washed with chlorhexidine soap (Hibiscrub
®)
and disinfected with chlorhexidine alcohol. The opera-
tion theatres were partly cleaned with water + detergent
between procedures. If needed, e.g. in the case of infec-
tious discharge, disinfectant was used after cleaning.
The surgery recovery rooms had concrete floors and
paper bedding. The rooms were cleared of bedding and
hosed down with water on most working days and, if
needed, scrubbed with detergent. The sling (tarpaulin) car-
rying the patients in and out of the operating room and
mattresses used on the operation table were hosed down
with water when dirty. The slings were hung to dry out-
side the surgical unit and the mattresses hung within the
surgery unit.
Suspected contagious horses were admitted to the ISO.
The common practice for staff was to put on reusable pro-
tective gowns, gloves, cap and rubber boots or shoe-covers
in the ante-room before entering the ISO stalls. Foot bath
or mats soaked with Virkon
® were also used at the staff
entrance to ISO and sporadically elsewhere if symptoms of
contagious disease were detected after horses had already
been housed in a non-ISO stall and temporary isolation
was decided.
Walls and floors in wards were cleaned by staff, either
hosed down with pressure washer or scrubbed by hand
between patients. After a known infectious case, the
cleaning was followed by foaming with Virkon
®.
Environmental sampling and culture
The environmental sampling scheme was a consensus
decision by the community veterinarian (CV), the hospi-
tal and the author KB. The sampling was funded by the
UDS.
All environmental sampling in the hospital was carried
out by author KB after routine cleaning and disinfection.
Sterile cloths pre-impregnated with buffered peptone solu-
tion with 10% neutralising agent (lecithin, Tween 80, L-
histidine, and sodium thiosulphate), and gloves pre-packed
in stomacher bags (SodiBox
©, Névez, France) were used
[38]. At the start and between each sample, the sampler
disinfected her hands before putting on new gloves.
The environmental samples were divided into two
categories: 1) Surfaces or equipment in contact with
horses and people, named horse contact surfaces;a n d2 )
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nantly staff) had access, named hand touch surfaces.
Equipment or surfaces of a similar kind in one room or
unit were pooled into one sample. For sampling of lar-
ger surfaces, such as walls in a stall, one cloth was
gently rubbed in a 1-2 m
2 area extending from 5-20 cm
above the floor to about 1.7 m high vertically at least on
three of the walls. Floors were sampled by dragging the
cloth over most of the area, including floor drains.
Within five hours, 25 mL of Mueller-Hinton (MH)
broth with 6.5% NaCl were added to the stomacher bag
containing the cloth from the environmental sampling,
the contents were carefully mixed for 1 minute and the
stomacher bag was incubated overnight at 37°C. On the
next day, approximately 1 mL of the broth was inocu-
lated into 9 mL Trypton soy broth (TSB) containing 4%
NaCl, 1% mannitol, 16 mg/L phenol red and cefoxitin
3.5 mg/L (Sigma-Aldrich, Steinheim, Germany) and
aztreonam 75 mg/L (Bergman Labora, Danderyd, Swe-
den) and again incubated overnight at 37°C. Approxi-
mately 10 μL of the TSB were then plated onto
Brilliance MRSA agar, (Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK) with 5%
bovine blood agar and incubated at 37°C for 24 to 48 h.
Horse sampling and culture
Horses were sampled in nose or wound. Swabs contain-
ing Amies transport medium (Venturi Transystem
®,
COPAN, Italy) were used for sampling.
Samples from horses were analysed on the day of sam-
pling or the following day. The swab tip was clipped with
disinfected scissors, placed in 10 mL Trypton soy broth
(TSB) tubes containing 4% NaCl, 1% mannitol, 16 mg/L
phenol red and cefoxitin 1 mg/L (Sigma-Aldrich, Stein-
heim, Germany) + aztreonam 50 mg/L (Bergman Labora,
Danderyd, Sweden) and incubated overnight at 37°C.
Approximately 10 μL of the TSB were plated onto a Bril-
liance MRSA agar with 5% bovine blood agar (SVA) and
incubated at 37°C for 24 to 48 h.
Phenotyping of suspected S. aureus isolates was per-
formed as described previously [37].
Personnel sampling and culture
Voluntary MRSA testing of staff (nares, perineum) was
offered in September 2008. Sampling of people with
skin lesions and in contact with infected horses was
recommended by the Public Health. Samples from
humans were examined by an accredited Laboratory of
Clinical Microbiology.
Genotyping
All isolates from environmental samples were spa-typed
at the Swedish National Veterinary Institute (SVA) as
described by Harmsen et al. [39]. Macro-restriction ana-
lysis by PFGE was also carried out by SVA, using the
enzymes Cfr9I, a neoschizomer of SmaI, and ApaI
according to the HARMONY protocol [40]. Chromoso-
mal DNA of S. aureus NCTC 8325 was used as refer-
ence size markers for normalisation of PFGE gels.
Banding patterns were compared visually and the level
of similarity between patterns used for defining pulso-
types was a minimum of one band difference [41].
Genotyping of isolates from the outbreak horses is
described in a previous study [37].
Statistics
Descriptive statistics and individual results are
presented.
Results
Initial planning
Table 1 summarises the course of events in chronological
order. The first intervention by the UDS was to suspend
elective surgery on July 4, the same day as the second
MRSA case was diagnosed. Stable A was closed for sani-
tation and positive horses still in hospital were moved to
the ISO unit. Veterinary authorities at the regional and
national levels and the Public Health authority directly
started to discuss necessary measures through telephone
consultations. The authorities involved were the SJV,
SVA, the CV and Public Health. The CV is responsible
for contagious disease in animals in the region. Interna-
tional contacts were established to collect information
from countries with higher prevalence and experience of
MRSA in horses. Representatives from the hospital and
the authorities had a planning meeting at the hospital at
the request of the UDS and on the initiative of the CV
(Table 1, Meeting 1). The interventions decided at this
meeting were: i) Phone tracing of all horses operated on
during the outbreak (May 22 to July 10) in order to locate
infected horses at home and culture those for MRSA
[37]; ii) Interior environmental sampling for MRSA
(Table 2, Figure 1); iii) Consultation of expertise in
human infection prevention and control (IC); and iv)
Purchase and installation of hand disinfection dispensers
at multiple strategic points. Other meetings followed for
feedback, discussions and reconsideration of plans. Min-
utes of the meetings were kept.
Interventions
An infection control committee consisting of the IC con-
sultant, representatives from the UDS management and
staff, the CV and SVA officials and an executive working
group with the IC consultant, a nurse responsible for
hygiene and a veterinarian was formed to develop and
implement routines and to work with the staff. Lectures
and teaching sessions on basic hygiene precautions as well
as basic information about MRSA and other resistant bac-
teria were given to all categories of staff.
Bergström et al. Acta Veterinaria Scandinavica 2012, 54:14
http://www.actavetscand.com/content/54/1/14
Page 6 of 14Table 2 Scheme and results of environmental sampling for MRSA on nine occasions in an equine hospital
Setting Sampling area Sample cat.
4) 2008 July 25 Nov 19 Dec 1 2009 June 8 Sep 29 Oct 15 2010 Mar 4 Mar 17 Apr 15 Total
Ward A
Stable A -
surgery
patients
Walls + floor 1 0/1
7) 0/1 - -
5) 0/1 - - - - 0/1 - - - - 0/4
Water feeders 1 0/1 0/1 R
6) R R R R R R 0/2
Water buckets 1 - - 0/1 - - 0/1 - - - - - - - - - - 0/2
Muzzles + twitches 1 0/1 0/1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0/2
Salt stones + cribs 1 1/1 RR R RR R RR1/1
Room 3
1) Light switch + door knobs 2 0/1 0/1 - - 0/1 - - - - - - - - - - 0/3
Surgery unit Tarpaulins + traverse 1 1/1 0/1 R R R R R R R 1/2
Recovery room 1 1 0/1 0/1 - - 0/1 0/1 - - 0/1 - - - - 0/5
Recovery room 2 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - 0/1 - - - - 0/1
Prep. stall + tracheotube 1 0/1 0/1 - - 0/1 0/1 - - 0/1 - - - - 0/5
Mobile operating table 1 0/1 0/1 - - - - 0/1 - - 0/1 - - - - 0/4
Surgery equipment 1 - - - - - - - - 0/1 - - - - - - - - 0/1
Surgery equipment 2 0/1 0/1 - - 1/1 0/3 - - 0/2 - - - - 1/8
Lameness run-up Door knobs (n = 21) 2 1/1 1/1 0/7
8) 0/4
8) -- -- 0 / 1 -- -- 2/14
ISO
2) Ante-room 2 2/2 - - - - 0/2 - - 0/2 - - - - 0/1 2/7
Stall, walls + floor 1 0/1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0/1
Stall, floor 1 - - - - - - - - - - 0/1 - - - - - - 0/1
Stall, walls 1 - - - - - - - - - - 0/1 - - - - 1/1 1/2
Treatment area 1 0/1 - - - - - - - - 0/1 - - - - 0/1 0/3
Treatment area 2 - - - - - - 0/1 - - - - - - - - - - 0/1
Day patient
area
Treatment room 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - 0/1 - - - - 0/1
Treatment room 2 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - 0/1 - - - – 0/1
Treatment room 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - 0/1 - - - - 0/1
Ward B
Room 4 Treatment stall 1 1/1 0 / 1 -- 0 / 1 -- -- 0 / 2 -- -- 1/5
Stable K -
ICU
3)
Walls + floor outside stall 1 - - - - - - - - 0/1 - - 0/1 0/1 - - 0/3
Walls + floor inside stall 1 1/1 0/1 - - 0/1 0/1 - - 0/1 0/1 - - 1/6
Outside stall 2 0/1 0/1 - - 0/1 - - - - - - - - - - 0/3
Equipment Medicine cart 2 - - - - - - - - 0/1 - - - - - - - - 0/1
Bandage cart 2 - - - - - - - - 0/1 - - - - - - - - 0/1
Dental equipment 1 - - - - - - 0/1 - - - - - - - - - - 0/1
Total 7/18 1/14 0/7 1/17 0/11 0/5 0/15 0/2 1/3 10/92
Equipment or surfaces of a similar kind in one room or unit were pooled into one sample. For example, a number of door knobs/water feeders/salt stones + cribs were wiped with one cloth, making one pooled
sample
1) standing surgery;
2) isolation unit;
3) intensive care unit;
4) denotes sampling category, horse touch surfaces = 1 and hand touch surfaces, where no horse had access =2 ,
5)- - = not done,
6) R = replaced,
7) Number
of positive/total number of samples.
8) The 21 doorknobs divided into seven and four samples, respectively
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4Policy documents (written routines) were developed
and implemented during the seven months after the out-
break and the documents were made available to all at
the hospital. The written routines were: 1. Basic personal
hygiene policy. 2. Hygiene in surgery unit. 3. General sur-
gery unit routine including cleaning, instrument washing
and disinfection, and preparation of horses for surgery. 4.
Cleaning routine: ISO. 5. Cleaning routine: day patient
area. 6. Cleaning routine: remaining stables 7. Cleaning
and disinfection: flexible endoscope.
The main issues of the written routine 1. Basic personal
hygiene policy, were: i) Wrist watches, rings and other
jewellery not allowed to be worn in clinical work. ii)
Long hair to be tied back, nails cut short and free from
coloured nail polish. iii) Hand hygiene; in the case of visi-
ble dirt, washing with soap and disinfecting hands
between patients and/or different procedures; if no visible
dirt only disinfection between patients or procedures. iv)
Disposable gloves to be used in contact with pus, secre-
tions, blood and other potentially contagious material.
Hands disinfected before putting on and after taking off
gloves. v) Working and protective clothing to be worn, as
described in more detail below. Members of staff as well
as teachers and students were required to read and sign
their own copy of the document.
No private clothes were allowed at work. All members
of staff were provided with short-sleeved working clothes,
worn only at work and changed daily or earlier if dirty.
Aprons for protection of the working clothes were made
available in treatment rooms and stables. Fleece vests to
be worn on top of short-sleeved clothes for warmth were
offered to the staff. Outdoor work jackets were allowed,
as long as the basic hygiene routines were followed and
special holders for the jackets were installed. At the ISO
unit, disposable protective overalls/gowns, clothes, caps
and boots were installed in the preparation room, to be
donned before entry to the isolated horse.
Disposable overalls, caps and clean shoes had to be
donned before entry to the surgical unit and clothes used
outside the unit were prohibited. Staff working in the
surgery unit was provided with special working clothes.
Wound care hygiene was improved through implemen-
tation of contact precautions following the ‘Basic perso-
nal hygiene policy’ and all waste after wound care had to
be put directly into plastic waste disposal bags. Sampling
for culture of all patients with SSI or traumatic wound
infection before any treatment started was implemented
as a routine. Work to devise better routines for wound
care by drainage, gentle cleansing, different dressings,
less use of antimicrobials and formulating a written
wound care policy is still ongoing.
Multiple dispensers with alcohol hand-rub were placed
at strategic points, beside all doors and sinks, easy to find
and use. Disinfectants had to be kept in their original
packaging. Extra clocks were bought and mounted on
walls, as well as watches to pin on working clothes to
replace wrist watches.
The cleaning routines could not be much improved in
the wards, as most of the surfaces were rough and man-
ual cleaning difficult, but one stable at a time was closed
for incoming patients and cleaned. Salt stones, cribs and
water feeders in stalls that could not be cleaned were
removed and replaced with buckets. A flusher-disinfector
was installed for emptying and cleaning buckets between
patients. Loose equipment such as twitches and muzzles
were removed from the stables and a routine to change
the twitch rope and clean and disinfect twitch and muz-
zle between patients was implemented. The routines for
handling, cleaning and disinfection of endoscopes were
devised with the aid of the endoscope manufacturer,
resulting in less damage and better maintenance for
bronchoscopes and arthroscopes.
The walls, floors and other surfaces of the surgery thea-
tres were thoroughly cleaned by professional cleaners
trained at Uppsala University Hospital, using high pressure
washing and floor cleaning machines, before restart of sur-
gery after the outbreak. New manual cleaning routines,
including manual scrubbing of walls and floors with
appropriate detergents as well as wiping when feasible,
were implemented. Operating tables were covered with
disposable polyethylene sheets commonly used by con-
struction companies. Slings used to transport anesthetised
horses in the surgical unit were eliminated and leg lifts
were implemented. Equipment used near the patients
was wiped down with alcohol + detergent between
patients. Shavers were disassembled and manually
cleaned/disinfected. The sterilising area was equipped with
a flusher-disinfector and washable anaesthetic equipment
and a drying cabinet were installed. The functioning of the
autoclave and washer-disinfector was thoroughly checked
by the manufacturer. The surgery recovery rooms were re-
surfaced with a smooth, cleanable rubber mat on floors
and walls, and paper bedding was no longer used.
Patient movements
The number of patients treated at the UDS increased
from 4268 in 2007 to 6528 in 2009. From May 1 to Aug
31 2008, 1736 horses passed through the hospital (not
including radiology patients referred from outside the
UDS) and between 22 May and 10 July 2008 (outbreak
period), 45 horses underwent surgery. The suspension of
elective surgery during the outbreak resulted in a tem-
porary decrease in surgery procedures from an expected
30-40 per month to 10-14. Day patients and emergency
surgery were kept at same level throughout the outbreak.
Patient movements were better tracked and documented.
Horses with infected wounds and other contagious infec-
tions were more strictly isolated. The building design did
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patients within the hospital.
Costs
The costs for cleaning, renovation, installation of new
equipment and implementation of new routines etc.
were an estimated 1.2 million SEK or around 120,000
Euros at the approximate exchange rate during this per-
iod, e.g. expenditure on hand disinfectants and disposa-
ble gloves doubled from 2008 to 2009.
Environmental sampling and culture
Environmental samples were collected on nine occasions
between July 2008 and April 2010 (Table 2 Figure 1).
The first sampling was carried out about two weeks after
the second MRSA case had been identified. The second
and third samplings were performed when interventions
had been implemented and embedded (Table 2). Several
door knobs or water feeders or salt stones + cribs were
wiped with one cloth, giving pooled samples for these
types of objects (Table 2).
Ten (11%) of 92 samples were MRSA-positive. Seven
of these came from the first sampling occasion (Table
2). MRSA was found equally in both of the predeter-
mined sample categories: horse touch surfaces (n = 5)
and hand touch surfaces (n = 5). The sampling scheme
from July 2008 was approximately the same on three
more occasions (Table 2), but in November 2008 water
feeders and most of the cribs had been replaced by
buckets, which were sampled instead. A pooled sample
from 21 door knobs in the lameness run-up corridor
tested positive twice. In December 2008 all door knobs
were retested a third time, in which they were divided
into seven samples, with negative results. In June 2009
further sampling was performed. One computer key-
board that had not been cultured before was included in
the pooled sample of hand touch surgery equipment,
and tested positive for MRSA (Table 2). In September
2009, 11 pooled samples were taken, including the hand
touch surgery equipment that tested positive in June, and
all tested negative (Table 2).
Environmental sampling with fewer samples was car-
ried out on 15 October 2009 and 17 March and 15 April
2010 in the surgery unit and ISO when two sporadic
MRSA cases had been detected in September 2009 and
March 2010. With these samples, there was one positive
finding from an ISO stall where an MRSA-positive horse
had been housed (Table 2).
Horse sampling and culture
Fourteen asymptomatic contacts in the home stables of
Cases 1, 2 and 3 were cultured from the nares, and one
tested positive for MRSA spa-type t011. Forty-five horses
underwent surgery in the period May 22-July 10 2008.
The owners of 37 of these were reached by telephone,
and four reported horses with symptoms of infection
(secretions, swelling, etc.) at the surgical site. Three of
these were cultured, with one MRSA-positive result
(Case 5).
Personnel sampling and culture
One-third (12/30) of the hospital staff as well as four
people with skin lesions linked to positive infected
horses at home were tested for MRSA, and all tested
negative (Mia Runnerus, director of UDS, pers. comm.).
Genotyping
All environmental isolates were of spa-type t011, i.e. the
same as the isolates from the outbreak horses [37]. The
PFGE pattern was identical with both Cfr9I and ApaI
restriction for nine of 10 isolates, named pulsotype A.
The tenth isolate, the last one found in April 2010, lacked
one PFGE band in the ApaI gel, pulsotype A1 (Figure 2).
Discussion
T h eU n i v e r s i t yA n i m a lH o s p i tal offers highly qualified
surgery and medicine and some patients are immuno-
compromised. Consequently, the usage of antimicrobials
m i g h tb er e l a t i v e l yh i g h .S i n c ea n t i m i c r o b i a lu s a g eh a s
been described as a risk for equine MRSA colonisation
[11,42] effective infection prevention and control are
essential in such settings. Success in short-term eradica-
tion by sectioning, improved infection control and
repeated MRSA testing without using antimicrobials in
two Canadian farms with MRSA-colonised horses has
been reported [43]. The main interventions in the present
study were aimed at improved infection prevention and
control, supported by environmental sampling.
The hospital was expanding at the time of the out-
break, with an increase of about 1000 patients per year.
Increased patient flow with more horses housed in the
hospital may have led to more indirect and perhaps also
direct contacts between horses and thus a higher risk of
transmission of infections. Increased crowding was also
considered a risk of undesirable doping of horses by
pharmaceutical residues in the environment. Therefore
some precautions regarding handling of horses in the
hospital had been applied, although not documented,
before the MRSA outbreak.
There was a lag of over a month between surgery and
diagnosis of the two first MRSA cases and thereby a
delay in identification of the MRSA outbreak (Table 1).
T h es o u r c eo ft h eo u t b r e a kw a sn e v e rf o u n d ,s i n c et h e
first three horses infected had indirect cross-contacts
within the hospital [37]. The immediate suspension of
elective surgery when an outbreak was suspected resulted
in a temporary reduction in surgical patients. This gave
space and time for necessary interventions in the surgery
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strain. Emergency surgery continued, for animal welfare
reasons. After elective surgery was suspended, only one
horse, an emergency surgery patient, was infected by
MRSA. The closure of Stable A, where Cases 1-5 were
housed, was logical, as it could be expected to be highly
contaminated with MRSA. This was confirmed by the
first environmental sampling (Table 2).
Representatives from different disciplines, the CV, a
public health nurse and the SVA visited the UDS when
an outbreak was suspected and started a process of
change. Meeting face-to-face, walking around the hospi-
tal setting and discussing emerging issues from different
angles in a mutual conversation opened the way for sys-
tematic work. Public health aspects had to be consid-
ered, as MRSA is a zoonosis [12,15-17,21,22] which is
notifiable for humans, and prevention of MRSA trans-
mission between animals will reduce the risk for
humans too.
The executive working group transferred some general
infection prevention and control measures from human
medicine, such as basic hygiene. Further interventions
undertaken to curb the outbreak were based on this
general knowledge and on observed practices and short-
comings, as well as on environmental sampling.
In order to improve the guidelines for handling and
interventions in outbreak situations, knowledge of risk
factors for acquisition and spread of MRSA in horses is
needed. Horses colonised with MRSA on admission
were more likely to suffer from clinical infection than
non-colonised horses in one Canadian study [11]. In a
study of MRSA outbreaks in a Dutch equine hospital,
9.3% of horses tested positive on admission, and the
same spa-types were detected in infected horses [12].
Such studies could speak in favour of screening on
admission, but cannot effortlessly be transferred to low
prevalence countries, as Sweden. Admission to neonatal
intensive care was another identified risk factor for
MRSA colonisation [42]. About a year after the out-
break, a foal was admitted for neonatal care and MRSA
was later detected in a pressure wound. The MRSA sta-
tus of the foal and its mother on admission was not
known. On readmission for infection in September
2009, the foal was isolated before culture and the strain
did not cause further infections in other horses. Sam-
pling of horses on admission to hospital had not been
considered relevant prior to the outbreak described, as
only one MRSA horse had been detected earlier in the
country, a carrier in 2007 [18]. At present there is still
no general screening for MRSA in horses on admission
to the UDS because of the low prevalence, although
horses with discharging wounds are sampled.
Culture is time-consuming and therefore fast and reli-
able detection methods for screening on admission are
needed. A real-time PCR validated for diagnostic pur-
poses in humans has been evaluated, but proved
Figure 2 PFGE pattern with ApaI restriction enzyme showing
different pulsotypes of environmental MRSA isolates spa-type
t011. One band of difference (arrow), Right lane - pulsotype A. Left
lane - pulsotype A1.
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risk patients might be recommended, e.g. horses with
infected wounds, previously known MRSA infection/car-
riage, coming from high prevalence areas or hospitals
with a known outbreak etc., but only if all these patients
could be isolated prior to the sampling results. Studies
in humans have shown that isolation of a patient only
when a positive result is obtained does not reduce trans-
mission to other patients if basic precautions are not
consistently taken [45].
Screening cultures are not wholly reliable and may give
a false sense of security. There might even be a risk of
staff handling screened horses testing negative with less
care if horses are divided into MRSA-positive and nega-
tive groups, and thus the risk of contagious infection
could increase for the negative group. Basic precautions
and good cleaning routines must be implemented
throughout the year and for every patient, irrespective of
culture results. Isolation in single stalls should be imple-
mented for risk patients such as those with discharging
wounds.
Screening of asymptomatic contacts can be useful for
epidemiological investigations and for interventions in an
outbreak. Based on the severity of the disease and the
risk to animal and human populations, SJV can initiate
and pay for mandatory sampling. Contact tracing of dis-
charged horses that had been operated on during the
outbreak period led to the identification of one more
infected horse, Case 5 [37]. Nasal screening of the large
numbers of asymptomatic horses that visited the hospital
during the outbreak period would have required the
owners’ consent, as MRSA is not subject to mandatory
tracing in animals and no resources were available for
this. Therefore, there were gaps in the information and
we do not know how the outbreak was maintained dur-
ing the weeks between the first and second cluster of
cases. Information about personnel is also lacking, as
about two-thirds did not attend the sampling.
Environmental sampling was introduced in order to
identify routes of indirect contact transmission. No stan-
dard or recommended method for environmental sam-
pling of MRSA was available at the time, and the sampling
and culture method was a combination of methods
described in the literature and personal experience. The
surfaces in equine hospitals are often rough and large
areas have to be sampled and ordinary swabs or contact
plates cover only limited areas. Here wiping of similar sur-
faces and pooling of samples was performed in order to
cover as many items and as large an area as possible at a
reasonable cost. The pre-impregnated cloths used have
been tested in similar studies of environmental enterococci
[38]. The pre-impregnation neutralise possible residues of
cleaning and disinfection agents. The sensitivity and speci-
ficity of the method is not known, as there is no ‘gold
standard’. Our culture method, with high-salt pre-enrich-
ment broth and a second specific broth, was similar to the
more sensitive method identified by v. Duijkeren et al.
when comparing two methods [12]. The majority of the
positive samples in the UDS were found in connection
with the outbreak and the number of positive samples
decreased as expected after interventions were implemen-
ted (Table 2). The second sampling (Table 2) was carried
out after major interventions had been initiated. Dividing
the twice positive 21 doorknobs pooled sample into seven
pools, when retesting 1 December 2008, were made to
check if many doorknobs might be positive, but this time
tested negative. Some time was then allowed to elapse for
the interventions to bed down before the third sampling
in June 2009, as the main purpose of repeated sampling
was to monitor improvements.
The MRSA isolates found in the environment had the
same PFGE pattern as the isolates from the outbreak
horses described earlier [37]. The isolate from last envir-
onmental sampling, in April 2010, showed a slight
genetic change in PFGE, pulsotype A1, compared with
t h en i n ep r e v i o u si s o l a t e s( F i g u r e2 ) .T h i si s o l a t ew a s
found in an ISO stall after a horse with the same pulso-
type (A1) had been discharged. The isolate was still con-
sidered to have the same origin as the other nine. It is
not uncommon for bacterial strains to change genetically
over time and a one to two band difference in PFGE is
considered to be closely related [41].
In order to distinguish between human contamination
and horse/human contamination, the sampling surfaces
were divided into two categories, horse touch surfaces
and hand touch surfaces (Table 2). The results of the
environmental sampling were used for educational pur-
poses, to increase awareness of basic hygiene, and for the
planning of interventions. Findings of the MRSA strain
on hand touch surfaces indicated spread by humans
(Table 2 Figure 1). The finding of MRSA on door knobs
(Table 2 Figure 1) led to the installation of dispensers
with alcohol hand-rub beside all doors, with the idea
‘easy to find and do right’. Other ways of improving con-
tact precautions (basic hygiene) were better clothing rou-
tines, the increased use of plastic aprons and gloves, and
the replacement of disinfectant shoe baths/mats with dis-
posable boots for isolation stalls.
The finding of MRSA in a sample from salt stones and
cribs supported the decision to remove those and the
water feeders and replace them with buckets. Buckets
were easy to clean in the installed flusher-disinfector and
they tested negative for MRSA on two occasions (Table 2).
An additional benefit was better water control for the
patients. As MRSA was found in the pooled sample of the
sling (tarpaulins) and traverse in the surgery unit, these
were removed. Using disposable plastic sheets on the
mobile operation tables was the unconventional solution
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reasonable levels.
Staphylococcus aureus, including MRSA, can persist on
dry inanimate surfaces for months [46], and cleaned sur-
faces are rapidly recontaminated when infective patients
are present. Therefore, the findings of MRSA where
infected horses had been stalled were not surprising. Writ-
ten disinfection and cleaning routines available to all were
developed and replaced long-standing procedures for
environmental cleaning and disinfection. Qualitative envir-
onmental sampling is not considered sensitive enough to
validate cleaning routines and should not be used for that
purpose [36]. Despite this, in the present outbreak nega-
tive environmental cultures tended to give staff a false
sense of security, as they tended to interpret these as suc-
cessful eradication of MRSA.
Some items were more difficult to improve, e.g. floor
coverings, which need to be rough for the safety of the
horses but then become difficult to clean. The walls and
floors in the surgery recovery rooms were worn out and
considered a high risk for the spread of MRSA and were
replaced with non-porous and easy to clean material. The
remaining floors were not changed, since the outbreak
coincided with construction plans for a new hospital
building. Improvement of infection prevention and con-
trol in the daily clinical routines was gradually achieved
but the conditions in the building were a limiting factor
for cleaning.
The doubling in expenditure on gloves and disinfec-
tants is a reasonable indication of improved standards of
hygiene. On the other hand, MRSA was still found on
surfaces that were not directly available to horses long
after the last outbreak case of MRSA. Thus, compliance
with basic hygiene and/or cleaning and disinfection rou-
tines has improved but is still not complete and requires
continual follow-up to ensure maximum effect. Methods
to measure compliance with hygiene routines need to be
introduced in veterinary practice. Observational studies
are a possibility to record improvements in hygiene rou-
tines. Quantifying the efficacy of the interventions would
also be advantageous, but was not the aim of this study.
The interventions led to a reduction in MRSA-positive
samples, and no new cases occurred for over a year,
despite the extended presence of a colonised horse
(Case 6). The case detected 14 months after the out-
break, a foal admitted for neonatal care in June 2009,
had the same MRSA strain as the six outbreak horses in
2008 [37]. The strain was also found on hand touch sur-
faces in the surgery unit in June 2009. Whether this was
the cause or the effect of the presence of an infected/
colonised horse could not be determined, as we do not
know whether the foal was carrying the strain on admis-
sion or became infected within the hospital. No other
MRSA infections were detected in connection with this
case. The case that occurred in March 2010 was also a
single case without any other detected infections in the
hospital. It is unlikely that pathogenic MRSA would
remain undetected, as all infected wounds were cul-
tured. The MRSA ST398, spa-type t011, is common
outside Sweden [12,13,15,16]. A closely related strain
caused an infection linked to another equine hospital in
the area in 2009 [37]. This indicates that the strain is
present in the region outside the hospital studied here.
We therefore consider Case 6 to be the last case in the
outbreak and the other two later cases as sporadic.
The costs of an outbreak will differ between clinical
settings and can be divided into different categories in
order to have clear view of expenses: i) Costs directly
linked to an outbreak, exemplified by suspension of elec-
tive surgery, extra working hours, isolation of horses,
damage to reputation resulting in a future decrease in
patients, bacteriological sampling, hire of a cleaning team
and IC expert; ii) running costs to achieve general high
quality, exemplified by increased expenditure on disposa-
ble gloves, other disposable items, soap, disinfectants,
clothes, continuous education and revision of routines;
and iii) depreciable investments, exemplified by renova-
tion of recovery rooms, purchase of washer and flusher-
disinfectors, changing from water feeders to buckets.
Distinction of costs into these categories was not done
at the UDS. The calculation of total cost resulted in a
rather high figure, but depreciable investments were
included and it is debatable whether such investments
should be fully included as costs due to an outbreak.
Direct costs and running costs might also have been
under- or over-estimated, as they are difficult to calculate
exactly. If detailed distinctions had been made during the
process, it would have been easier to analyse the cost ele-
ments justified for future infection control.
This outbreak and earlier incidents of MRSA in pets,
mainly dogs, have resulted in growing interest in infec-
tion prevention and control policies by Swedish animal
hospitals and clinics. MRSA has been notifiable since 1
January 2008 in animals. Guidelines for owners of
MRSA-positive horses were published on the SVA web-
site in July 2008. A Swedish Government Commission
draft strategy from March 2011 against antimicrobial
resistance and nosocomial infections drawn up by the
National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen)
includes veterinary medicine [47]. Infection prevention
and control has been introduced as a topic in the Veter-
inary Nursing programme at the Swedish University of
Agricultural Sciences since 2009. This is an important
step towards a more professional view of veterinary med-
icine infection prevention and control for the future.
The outbreak had consequences outside the hospital
and authority sphere, as in 2009 the Swedish Equestrian
Federation and the Swedish Horse Racing Totalisator
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MRSA infection and 20 days after healing of the infec-
tion:http://www3.ridsport.se/Tavling/Vill-du-borja-tavla/
Smittinfo/ and https://www.travsport.se/polopoly_fs/
1.574!/menu/standard/file/smittskyddsreglement2010.pdf
Conclusions
Joint efforts by hospital management, microbiology and
infection control, with support from local and national
authorities, curbed the MRSA outbreak studied here.
T h eo c c u r r e n c eo fs i n g l eh o r s e si n f e c t e db yt h es a m e
strain and subsequent findings of the MRSA strain in
the hospital and the surrounding region show the need
for continuous awareness and improvement of infection
prevention and control measures.
Long-term improvement of infection prevention and
control in the hospital can be achieved through written
policies for basic hygiene and for isolation of infected
cases, as well as for improved cleaning and disinfection.
Environmental samples can be useful for identification of
routes of transmission, education of staff and identification
of surfaces and equipment that cannot be cleaned or disin-
fected and should be replaced, although this is not always
feasible in equine hospitals.
Knowledge of infection prevention and control,
nationally and in the veterinary profession, is necessary
for the prevention of future MRSA outbreaks in equine
hospitals.
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